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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the generic processes and linkages that comprise financial 
intermediation – the basic ’financial hydraulics’ that ultimately drive efficiency and 
innovation in the financial system and its impact on real-sector resource allocation and 
economic growth. Maximum economic welfare demands a high-performance financial 
system. What does this actually mean? It documents some of the structural changes that 
have occurred in both national and global financial systems, and suggests how the 
microeconomics of financial intermediation work. These can have an enormous impact on 
the industrial structure of the financial services industry and on individual firms. 
Sequentially, financial channels that exhibit greater static and dynamic efficiency have 
supplanted less efficient ones. Competitive distortions can retard this process, but they 
usually extract significant economic costs and at the same time divert financial flows into 
other venues, either domestically or elsewhere. The paper also examines the consequences 
of this process in terms of financial sector reconfiguration, both within and between the 
four major segments of the industry (commercial banking, securities and investment 
banking, insurance, and asset management) as well as within and between national financial 
systems. Finally, the paper superimposes key regulatory overlays onto the basic economics 
and facts of reconfiguration in financial intermediation. This is a ’special’ industry, due 
both to the imbedded systemic risks and its fiduciary nature. Balancing financial efficiency 
against stability and fairness is not easy. The economics of financial intermediation are 
highly regulation-sensitive, so small changes in regulation can create important changes in 
markets. Regulators inevitably make some mistakes, and regulatory mandates are unusually 
contentious and vulnerable to entrenched economic interests. This is also a discussion of  
the linkages between structural change in financial intermediation and supervisory and 
regulatory functions, including some comparisons between US and European legacies and 
prospects. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Few industries have encountered as much ’strategic turbulence’ in recent years as the financial 
services sector. In response to far-reaching regulatory and technological change, together with 
important shifts in client behaviour and the de facto globalisation of specific financial functions, the 
organisational structure of the industry has been profoundly displaced and there remains a great 
deal of uncertainly about the nature of any future equilibrium in the industry’s contours. 
 Section 2.2 of this paper considers the generic processes and linkages that comprise 
financial intermediation – the basic ’financial hydraulics’ that ultimately drive efficiency and 
innovation in the financial system and its impact on real-sector resource allocation and economic 
growth. Maximum economic welfare demands a high-performance financial system. What does this 
actually mean? 
 Section 2.3 documents some of the structural changes that have occurred in both national 
and global financial systems, and suggests how the microeconomics of financial intermediation 
work. These can have an enormous impact on the industrial structure of the financial services 
industry and on individual firms. Sequentially, financial channels that exhibit greater static and 
dynamic efficiency have supplanted less efficient ones. Competitive distortions can retard this 
process, but they usually extract significant economic costs and at the same time divert financial 
flows into other venues, either domestically or elsewhere. 
 Section 2.4 examines the consequences of this process in terms of financial sector 
reconfiguration, both within and between the four major segments of the industry (commercial 
banking, securities and investment banking, insurance, and asset management) as well as within 
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and between national financial systems. 
 Section 2.5 of the paper superimposes key regulatory overlays onto the basic economics 
and facts of reconfiguration in financial intermediation. This is a ’special’ industry, due both to the 
imbedded systemic risks and its fiduciary nature. Balancing financial efficiency against stability and 
fairness is not easy. The economics of financial intermediation are highly regulation-sensitive, so 
small changes in regulation can create important changes in markets. Regulators inevitably make 
some mistakes, and regulatory mandates are unusually contentious and vulnerable to entrenched 
economic interests. 
 The final section of the paper considers the linkages between structural change in financial 
intermediation and supervisory and regulatory functions, including some comparisons between US 
and European legacies and prospects. 
 
2.2 A stylized process of financial intermediation 
 
The central component of any model of a modern financial system is the nature of the conduits 
through which the financial assets of the ultimate savers flow -through to the liabilities of the 
ultimate users of finance, both within and between national economies. This involves alternative 
and competing modes of financial intermediation, or ’contracting’, between counterparties in 
financial transactions.  
 A guide to thinking about financial contracting and the role of financial institutions and 
markets is summarised in Exhibit 1.1 The diagram depicts the financial process (flow-of-funds) 
among the different sectors of the economy in terms of underlying environmental and regulatory 
determinants or drivers as well as the generic advantages needed to profit from three primary 
linkages: 
1. Fully intermediated financial flows. Savings (the ultimate sources of funds in financial 
systems) may be held in the form of deposits or alternative types of claims issued by 
commercial banks, savings organisations, insurance companies or other types of financial 
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institutions that finance themselves by placing their liabilities directly with the general public. 
Financial institutions ultimately use these funds to purchase assets issued by non-financial 
entities such as households, firms and governments. 
2. Investment banking and securitized intermediation. Savings may be allocated directly or 
indirectly via fiduciaries and collective investment vehicles, to the purchase of securities 
publicly issued and sold by various pubic- and private- sector organisations in the domestic 
and international financial markets. 
3. Direct-connect mechanisms between ultimate borrowers and lenders. Savings surpluses 
may be allocated to borrowers through various kinds of direct-sale mechanisms, such as 
private placements, usually involving fiduciaries as intermediaries. 
 
EXHIBIT 1 
 
 Ultimate users of funds comprise the same three segments of the economy — the household or 
consumer sector, the business sector and the government sector.  
1. Consumers may finance purchases by means of personal loans from banks or by loans 
secured by purchased assets (hire-purchase or installment loans). These may appear on 
the asset side of the balance sheets of credit institutions for the duration of the respective 
loan contracts on a revolving basis, or they may be sold off into the financial market in the 
form various kinds of securities backed by consumer credit receivables.  
2. Corporations may borrow from banks in the form of unsecured or asset-backed straight or 
revolving credit facilities and/or may sell debt obligations (for example commercial paper, 
receivables financing, fixed-income securities of various types) or equities directly into the 
financial market.  
3. Governments may likewise borrow from credit institutions (sovereign borrowing) or issue 
securities directly.  
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Borrowers such as corporations and governments also have the possibility of privately issuing and 
placing their obligations with institutional investors, thereby circumventing both credit institutions 
and the public debt and equity markets. Consumer debt can also be repackaged as asset-backed 
securities and sold privately to institutional investors. 
 In the first mode of financial contracting in Exhibit 1, depositors buy the ’secondary’ financial 
claims or liabilities issued by credit institutions, and benefit from liquidity, convenience, and safety 
through the ability of financial institutions to diversify risk and improve credit quality by means of 
professional management and monitoring of their holdings of primary financial claims (both debt 
and equity). Savers can choose from among a set of standardized contracts and receive payments 
services and interest. 
 In the second mode of financial intermediation in Exhibit 1, investors can select their own 
portfolios of financial assets directly from among the publicly issued debt and equity instruments on 
offer. This may provide a broader range of options than standardized bank contracts, and permit the 
larger investors to tailor portfolios more closely to their objectives while still achieving acceptable 
liquidity through rapid and cheap execution of trades – aided by linkages with banks and other 
financial institutions that are part of the domestic payments mechanism. Investors may also choose 
to have their portfolios professionally managed, for a fee, through various types of mutual funds and 
pension funds – designated in Exhibit 1 as collective investment vehicles. 
 In the third mode of financial intermediation, institutional investors buy large blocks of 
privately issued securities. In doing so, they often face a liquidity penalty – due to the absence or 
limited availability of a liquid secondary market – for which they are rewarded by a higher yield. On 
the other hand, directly placed securities can be specifically ’tailored’ to more closely match issuer 
and investor requirements than can publicly issued securities. Market and regulatory developments 
(such as SEC Rule 144A in the US) have added to the liquidity of some direct-placement markets.  
 Value to ultimate savers and investors, inherent in the financial processes described here, 
accrues in the form of a combination of yield, safety and liquidity. Value to ultimate users of funds 
accrues in the form of a combination of financing cost, transactions cost, flexibility and liquidity. This 
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value can be enhanced through credit backstops, guarantees and derivative instruments such as 
forward rate agreements, caps, collars, futures and options. Furthermore, markets can be linked 
functionally and geographically, both domestically and internationally. Functional linkages permit 
bank receivables, for example, to be repackaged and sold to nonbank securities investors. Privately 
placed securities, once they have been seasoned, may be able to be sold in public markets. 
Geographic linkages make it possible for savers and issuers to gain incremental benefits in foreign 
and offshore markets, thereby enhancing liquidity and yield or reducing transaction costs. 
 
Static and dynamic efficiency characteristics of financial systems 
Static efficiency properties of the three alternative financial processes can be measured by the all-
in, weighted average spread (differential) between rates of return provided to ultimate savers and 
the cost of funds to users. This spread is a proxy for the total cost of using a particular type of 
financial process, and is reflected in the monetary value of resources consumed in the course of 
financial intermediation. In particular, it reflects direct costs of financial intermediation (operating 
and administrative costs, cost of capital, and so on). It also reflects losses incurred in the financial 
process, as well as any excess profits earned and liquidity premiums. Financial processes that are 
considered ’statically inefficient’ are usually characterised by high all-in margins due to high 
overhead costs, high losses, concentrated markets and barriers to entry, etc. 
Dynamic efficiency is characterised by high rates of financial product and process innovation 
through time. 
1. Product innovations usually involve creation of new financial instruments along with the 
ability to replicate certain financial instruments by bundling or rebundling existing ones 
(synthetics). There are also new approaches to contract pricing, new investment 
techniques, and other innovations that fall under this rubric. 
2. Process innovations include contract design and methods of trading, clearance and 
settlement, custody, techniques for efficient margin calculation, and so on. Successful 
product and process innovation broadens the menu of financial services available to 
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ultimate issuers, ultimate savers, or other participants in the various financial channels 
described in Exhibit 1. 
It is against a background of continuous pressure for static and dynamic efficiency that financial 
markets and institutions have evolved and converged. Global financial markets for foreign 
exchange, debt instruments and to a lesser extent equity have developed various degrees of 
’seamlessness’, and it is arguable that the most advanced of the world's financial markets are 
approaching a theoretical, ’complete’ optimum where there are sufficient financial instruments and 
markets, and combinations thereof, to span the whole state-space of risk and return outcomes. 
Financial systems that are deemed inefficient or incomplete tend to be characterised by a limited 
range of financial services and obsolescent financial processes. 
 Exhibit 2 gives some indication of recent technological change in financial intermediation, 
particularly leveraging the properties of the Internet. Although not all of these initiatives have been 
successful or will survive, some have enhanced financial intermediation efficiencies. Internet 
applications have already dramatically cut information and transaction costs for both retail and 
wholesale end-users of the financial system as well as for financial intermediaries themselves. The 
examples of on-line banking, insurance, retail brokerage given in Exhibit 2 are well known and 
continue to evolve and change the nature of the process, sometimes turning prevailing business 
models on their heads. For example, financial intermediaries have traditionally charged for 
transactions and provided advice almost for free, but increasingly are forced to provide transactions 
services almost for free and to charge for advice. The new models are often far more challenging 
for market participants. 
 
EXHIBIT 2 
 
At the same time, on-line distribution of financial instruments such as commercial paper, equities 
and bonds in primary capital markets not only cuts the cost of market access but also improves and 
deepens the distribution and bookbuilding process – including providing issuers with information on 
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the investor-base. And as Exhibit 1 suggests, it is only one further step to cutting out the 
intermediary altogether by putting the issuer and the investor or fiduciary into direct electronic 
contact. The same is true in secondary markets, as shown in Exhibit 2, with an increasing array of 
alliance-based competitive bidding utilities (FXall) and reverse auctions (Currenex.com) in foreign 
exchange and other financial instruments as well as inter-dealer brokerage, cross-matching and 
electronic communications networks (ECNs). When all is said and done, Internet-based technology 
overlay is likely to have turbocharged the cross-penetration story depicted in Exhibit 1.  
 A further development consists of automated end-user platforms such as CFOWeb.com for 
corporate treasury operations and Quicken 2001 for households, with real-time downloads of 
financial positions, risk profiles, market information, research, and so on.. By allowing end-users to 
’cross-buy’ financial services from best-in-class vendors, such utilities could upset conventional 
thinking that focuses on ’cross-selling’, notably at the retail end of the end-user spectrum. If this is 
correct, financial firms that are following Allfinanz or bancassurance strategies may end up trapped 
in the wrong business model, as open-architecture approaches facilitating easy access to best-in-
class suppliers begin to gain market share. 
 Both static and dynamic efficiency in financial intermediation are of obvious importance 
from the standpoint of national and global resource allocation. That is, since financial services can 
be viewed as ’inputs’ to real economic processes, the level of national output and income – as well 
as its rate of economic growth – are directly or indirectly affected. A ’retarded’ financial services 
sector can be a major impediment to a nation's overall economic performance. Financial-system 
retardation represents a burden on the final consumers of financial services and potentially reduces 
the level of private and social welfare. It also represents a burden on producers, by raising their cost 
of capital and eroding their competitive performance in domestic and global markets. These 
inefficiencies ultimately distort the allocation of labour as well as capital. 
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2.3 The facts – shifts in intermediary market shares 
 
Developments over the past several decades in intermediation processes and institutional design 
both across time and geography are striking. In the United States ’commercial banks’ – institutions 
that accept deposits from the pubic and make commercial loans – have seen their market share of 
domestic financial flows between end-users of the financial system decline from about 75 per cent 
in the 1950s to under 25 per cent today. In Europe the change has been much less dramatic, and 
the share of financial flows running though the balance sheets of banks continues to be well over 60 
per cent– but declining nonetheless. And in Japan banks continue to control in excess of 70 per 
cent of financial intermediation flows. Most emerging market countries cluster at the highly 
intermediated end of the spectrum, but in many of these economies there is also factual evidence of 
declining market shares of traditional banking intermediaries. Classic banking functionality, in short, 
has been in long-term decline more or less worldwide. 
 Where has all the money gone? Disintermediation as well as financial innovation and 
expanding global linkages have redirected financial flows through the securities markets. Exhibit 4 
shows developments in the United States from 1970 to 2000, highlighting the extent of commercial 
bank market share losses and institutional investor gains. While this may be an extreme case, even 
in highly intermediated financial systems like Germany (Exhibit 5) direct equity holdings and 
managed funds have increased from 9.6 per cent to 22.7 per cent in just the 1990 - 2000 period. 
 
EXHIBIT 4 
 
EXHIBIT 5 
 
Ultimate savers increasingly use the fixed-income and equity markets directly and through 
fiduciaries which, through vastly improved technology, are able to provide substantially the same 
functionality as classic banking relationships – immediate access to liquidity, transparency, safety, 
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and so on – coupled to a higher rate of return. The one thing they cannot guarantee is settlement at 
par, which in the case of transactions balances (for example money market mutual funds) is 
mitigated by portfolio constraints mandating high-quality, short maturity financial instruments. 
Ultimate users of funds have benefited from enhanced access to financial markets across a broad 
spectrum of maturity and credit quality using conventional and structured financial instruments. 
Although market access and financing cost normally depend on the current state of the market, 
credit and liquidity backstops can be easily provided. 
 At the same time, a broad spectrum of derivatives overlays the markets, making it possible 
to tailor financial products to the needs of end-users with increasing granularity, further expanding 
the availability and reducing the cost of financing on the one hand and promoting portfolio 
optimization on the other. And as the end-users have themselves been forced to become more 
performance-oriented in the presence of much greater transparency and competitive pressures, it 
has become increasingly difficult to justify departures from highly disciplined financial behaviour on 
the part of corporations, public authorities and institutional investors.  
 In the process, two important and related differences are encountered in this generic 
financial-flow transformation. Intermediation shifts in the first place, from book-value to market-value 
accounting and in the second place from more intensively regulated to less intensively regulated 
channels, generally requiring less oversight and less capital. Both have clear implications for the 
efficiency properties of financial systems and for their transparency, safety and soundness. 
Regulatory focus in this context has migrated from institutions to markets. 
 
2.4 Consequences for institutional competitive advantage 
 
The basic microeconomics of financial intermediation have, to a significant extent, been reflected in 
the process of financial sector reconfiguration summarised in Exhibit 6.  
 
EXHIBIT 6 
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In retail financial services, extensive banking overcapacity in some countries has led to substantial 
consolidation – often involving M&A activity. Excess retail production and distribution capacity has 
been slimmed-down in ways that usually releases redundant labour and capital. In some cases this 
process is retarded by large-scale involvement of public-sector institutions and cooperatives that 
operate under less rigorous financial discipline. Also at the retail level, commercial banking activity 
has been linked strategically to retail brokerage, retail insurance (especially life insurance) and retail 
asset management through mutual funds, retirement products and private-client relationships. 
Sometimes this linkage process has occurred selectively (for example Lloyds TSB) and sometimes 
using simultaneous multi-links coupled to aggressive cross-selling efforts (for example Citigroup). At 
the same time, relatively small and focused firms have sometimes continued to prosper in each of 
the retail businesses, especially where they have been able to provide superior service or client 
proximity while taking advantage of outsourcing and strategic alliances where appropriate. 
 In wholesale financial services similar links have emerged. Wholesale commercial banking 
activities such as syndicated lending and project financing has often been shifted toward a greater 
investment banking focus, while investment banking firms have placed growing emphasis on 
developing institutional asset management businesses in part to benefit from vertical integration 
and in part to gain some degree of stability in a notoriously volatile industry.2 
 Exhibit 7 shows the global volume of financial services restructuring through merger and 
acquisitions activity from 1986 through 2000 – roughly two-thirds of which occurred in the banking 
sector, one quarter in insurance and the remainder in asset management and investment banking. 
Exhibit 8 shows the quarterly M&A dealflow during 1997-2000, by value, involving European 
financial services firms as either buyers or sellers, or both, and breaks-out some of the larger 
transactions during this period. 
 
EXHIBIT 7 
 
EXHIBIT 8 
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Exhibit 9 Indicates that the vast bulk of this activity occurred on an in-sector basis. Worldwide, 78 
per cent of the dealflow (by value) was in-sector – 85 per cent in the US (where line-of-business 
restrictions existed for most of the period) and 76 per cent in Europe (where there were no such 
barriers). So cross-sector M&A deals, including banking-insurance, were a small part of the picture  
– only 11.4 per cent even in Europe, home of bank assurance. 
 
EXHIBIT 9 
 
In addition to being largely in-sector, restructuring via M&A transactions was also largely domestic. 
Worldwide in commercial banking, less than 23 per cent (by value) was cross border. Only 12.7 per 
cent and 20.2 per cent of the US and European banking dealflow, respectively, was cross-border 
(mostly European banks buying US banks). Cross-border intra-European banking deals amounted 
to 25.8 per cent of the European total. The share of cross-border activity in the insurance sector has 
been roughly twice that of banking, which possibly suggests somewhat different economic 
pressures at work. With a few exceptions like HSBC and Citigroup globally, and Fortis, Nordea, 
ABN AMRO, ING, BSCH and BBVA as parts of regional or interregional strategies, the aggressive 
development of cross-border platforms seems to be the exception in the banking sector. In 
insurance, on the other hand, global initiatives by firms like AXA, AIG, Zurich, AEGON, ING, Allianz, 
Generali and GE Capital seem to be a more important part of the M&A picture.   
 Industrial economics suggests that structural forms in any sector, or between sectors, 
should follow the dictates of institutional comparative advantage. If there are significant economies 
of scale that can be exploited, it will be reflected in firm size. If there are significant economies of 
scope, either with respect to costs or revenues (cross-selling), then that will be reflected in the 
range of activities in which the dominant firms are engaged. If important linkages can be exploited 
across geographies or client segments, then this too will be reflected in the breadth and geographic 
scope of the most successful firms. 
 It seems clear, from a structural perspective, that a broad array of financial services firms 
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may perform one or more of the roles identified in Exhibit 1 – commercial banks, savings banks, 
postal savings institutions, savings cooperatives, credit unions, securities firms (full-service firms 
and various kinds of specialists), mutual funds, insurance companies, finance companies, finance 
subsidiaries of industrial companies, and others. Members of each strategic group compete with 
each other, as well as with members of other strategic groups. Assuming it is allowed to do so, each 
organisation elects to operate in one or more of the financial channels according to its own 
competitive advantages. Institutional evolution therefore depends on how these comparative 
advantages evolve, and whether regulation permits them to drive institutional structure. In some 
countries commercial banks, for example, have had to ’go with the flow’ and develop competitive 
asset management, origination, advisory, trading and risk management capabilities under constant 
pressure from other banks and, most intensively, from other types of financial services firms.  
 Take the US as a case in point. With financial intermediation distorted by regulation -
notably the Glass-Steagall provisions of the Banking Act of 1933 - banks half a century ago 
dominated classic banking functions, broker-dealers dominated capital market services and 
insurance companies dominated most of the generic risk management functions, as shown in 
Exhibit 10. Cross-penetration between different types of financial intermediaries existed mainly in 
savings products. 
 
EXHIBIT 10 
 
Some fifty years later this functional segmentation had changed almost beyond recognition despite 
the fact that full de jure deregulation was not implemented until the end of the period with the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999. Exhibit 11 and 12 show a virtual doubling of strategic groups 
competing for the various financial intermediation functions. Today there is vigorous cross-
penetration among them in the US. Most financial services can be obtained in one form or another 
from virtually every strategic group, each of which is, in turn, involved in a broad array of financial 
intermediation services. If cross-competition among strategic groups promotes both static and 
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dynamic efficiencies, then the evolutionary path of the US financial structure probably served 
macroeconomic objectives – particularly growth and economic restructuring – very well indeed. And 
line-of-business limits in force since 1933 have probably contributed, as an unintended 
consequence, to a much more heterogeneous financial system – certainly more heterogeneous 
than existed in the US of the 1920s or in most other countries today.3 This structural evolution has 
been accompanied in recent years by higher concentration ratios in various types of financial 
services - although not in retail banking, where concentration ratios have actually fallen. None of 
these concentrations are yet troublesome in terms of anti-trust concerns, and markets remain 
vigorously competitive. 
 
EXHIBIT 11 
 
EXHIBIT 12 
 
A similar coverage-analysis for Europe is not particularly credible because of the wide inter-country 
variations in financial structure. One common thread however, given the long history of universal 
banking, is that banks dominate most intermediation functions in many European countries, with the 
exception of insurance. And given European bancassurance initiatives, some observers think a 
broad-gauge banking-insurance convergence is likely. Except for the penetration of continental 
Europe by UK and US specialists, many of the relatively narrowly focused firms seem to have found 
themselves sooner or later acquired by major banking groups. Exhibit 15 may be a reasonable 
approximation of the continental European financial structure, with substantially less ’density’ of 
functional coverage by specific strategic groups than in the US and correspondingly greater 
dominance of major financial firms that include banking as a core business. 
 
EXHIBIT 15 
 
  
14
 
 
The structural evolution of national and regional financial systems seems to have an impact on 
global market-share patterns. With about 28.9 per cent of global GDP, US banking assets and 
syndicated bank loans are well underweight (they are overweight in Europe and Japan), whereas 
both bond and stock market capitalisations, capital market new-issues and fiduciary assets under 
management are overweight (they are underweight in Europe and Japan). One result is that US 
financial firms have come to dominate various intermediation roles in the financial markets – over 
half of global asset management mandates, over 77 per cent of lead manager positions in 
wholesale lending, two-thirds of bookrunning mandates in global debt and equity originations, and 
almost 80 per cent of advisory mandates (by value of deal) in completed merger and acquisitions 
transactions. Indeed, it is estimated that in 2000 US-based investment banks captured about 70 per 
cent of the fee-income on European capital markets and corporate finance transactions (see Smith 
and Walter, 2000a). 
 
 
Why? The reasons include the size of the US domestic financial market (accounting for roughly two-
thirds of global capital-raising and M&A transactions in recent years), early deregulation of markets 
(but not of institutions) dating back to the mid-1970s, and performance pressure bearing on 
institutional investors, as well as corporate and public-sector clients, leading to an undermining of 
client loyalty in favour of best price and best execution. Perhaps as an unintended consequence of 
separated banking since 1933, institutions dominating disintermediated finance – the American full-
service investment banks – evolved from close-knit partnerships with unlimited liability to large 
securities firms under intense shareholder pressure to manage their risks well and extract maximum 
productivity from their available capital. At the same time it was clear that, unlike the major 
commercial banks, regulatory bailouts of investment banks in case of serious trouble were highly 
unlikely. Indeed, major firms like Kidder Peabody and Drexel Burnham (at the time the seventh-
largest US financial institution in terms of balance sheet size) were left to die by the regulators. 
Subsequently, the capital-intensity and economic dynamics of the investment banking business has 
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caused most of the smaller and medium-size independent firms in both the US, the UK and 
elsewhere (for example Paribas in France and MeesPierson in the Netherlands) to disappear into 
larger banking institutions. 
 
 
It is interesting to speculate what the European matrix in Exhibit 15 will look like in ten or twenty 
years’ time. Some argue that the impact of size and scope is so powerful that the financial industry 
will be dominated by large complex financial institutions – not only for Europe but also for other 
markets. Others argue that a rich array of players, stretching across a broad spectrum of strategic 
groups, will serve financial systems better than a strategic monoculture based on massive universal 
banking organisations. Some argue that the disappearance of small community banks, independent 
insurance companies in both the life and nonlife sectors, and a broad array of financial specialists is 
probably not in the public interest especially if, at the end of the day, there are serious anti-trust 
concerns in this key sector of the economy. And as suggested in Exhibit 19, the disappearance of 
competitors can have significant transactions cost and liquidity consequences for financial markets 
– in this case non-investment grade securities. 
 
 
EXHIBIT 19 
 
At least so far, the most valuable financial services franchises in the United States and Europe in 
terms of market capitalisation seem far removed from a financial-intermediation monoculture. In 
fact, each presents a rich mixture of banks, asset managers, insurance companies and specialised 
players. How the institutional structure of the financial services sector will evolve is anybody’s 
guess. Those who claim to know often end up being wrong. Influential consultants sometimes 
convince multiple clients to do the same thing at the same time, and this spike in strategic 
correlation can contribute to the wrongness of their vision. What is clear is that the underlying 
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economics of the industry’s microstructure depicted in Exhibit 1 will ultimately prevail, and finance 
will flow along conduits that are in the best interests of the end-users of the financial system. The 
firms that comprise the financial services industry will have to adapt and readapt to this dynamic in 
ways that profitably sustain their raison d’être. 
 
2.5 The regulatory overlay 
 
The implied complexity of this story for financial regulation should be abundantly clear. Markets and 
institutions tend, perhaps more often than not, to run ahead of the regulators. Regulatory initiatives 
sometimes have consequences that were not and perhaps could not have been foreseen. The 
regulatory dialectic in the financial services sector is both sophisticated and complex, and often 
confronts both heavily entrenched and politically well connected interests (as well as some of the 
brightest minds in business). The more complex the industry – perhaps most dramatically in the 
case of massive, global financial services conglomerates where comprehensive regulatory insight is 
implausible – the greater the challenge to sensible regulation. Here we shall limit ourselves to some 
of the basic regulatory parameters that are consistent with the financial services industry dynamics 
presented earlier (Cumming and Hirtle, 2001). 
 We presuppose that the financial services industry worldwide has been, and will continue to 
be, subject to significant public-authority regulation and supervision due to the fiduciary nature of 
the business, the key role of financial systems in driving economic performance, the potential for 
financial fraud, and the possibility of serious social costs associated with financial failure. Indeed, 
we know from experience that even small changes in financial regulation can bring about large 
changes in financial system activity. We also know that, to the extent that information flows among 
counterparties in financial activities are imperfect, regulation can significantly improve the operation 
of financial systems – the greater the information asymmetries and transaction-cost inefficiencies 
that exist, the greater is the value of regulation quite apart from its benefits in terms of safety and 
soundness.4 And it sometimes seems that the more the financial intermediaries complain, the better 
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the regulators are doing their jobs.  
 Edward Kane is one of the pioneers in thinking about financial regulation and supervision 
as imposing a set of ’taxes’ and ’subsidies’ on the operations of financial firms exposed to them 
(see Kane, 1987). On the one hand, the imposition of reserve requirements, capital adequacy rules 
and certain financial disclosure requirements can be viewed as imposing ’taxes’ on a financial firm's 
activities in the sense that they increase intermediation costs. On the other hand, regulator-supplied 
deposit insurance, information production and dissemination, and lender-of-last resort facilities 
serve to stabilise financial markets, reduce information and transaction inefficiencies, improve 
liquidity and lower the risk of systemic failure – thereby improving the process of financial 
intermediation. They can therefore be viewed as implicit ’subsidies’ provided by taxpayers. 
 The difference between these ’tax’ and ’subsidy’ elements of regulation can be viewed as 
the ’net regulatory burden’ (NRB) faced by particular types of financial firms in any given jurisdiction. 
All else equal, financial flows tend to migrate toward those regulatory domains where NRB is 
lowest. NRB differences can induce financial-intermediation migration when the savings realised 
exceed the transaction, communication, information and other economic costs of migrating. Indeed, 
it has been argued that a significant part of the financial disintermediation discussed in Section 2.2 
of this paper – and its impact on various types of financial firms – has been due to differences in 
NRB, which is arguably highest in the case of commercial banks. Competition triggers a dynamic 
interplay between demanders and suppliers of financial services, as financial firms seek to reduce 
their NRB and increase their profitability. If they can do so at acceptable cost, they will actively seek 
product innovations and new avenues that avoid cumbersome and costly regulations by shifting 
them either functionally or geographically. 
 
Regulatory Tradeoffs 
The right side of Exhibit 21 identifies the policy tradeoffs that invariably confront those charged with 
designing and implementing a properly structured financial system. On the one hand, they must 
strive to achieve maximum static and dynamic efficiency with respect to the financial system as a 
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whole, as defined earlier, as well as promote the competitive viability of the financial industry. On 
the other hand, they must safeguard the stability of institutions and the financial system, in addition 
to helping to assure what is considered ’acceptable’ market conduct – including the politically 
sensitive implied social contract between financial institutions and unsophisticated clients. The first 
problem, safety-net design, is beset with difficulties such as moral hazard and adverse selection, 
and becomes especially problematic when products and activities shade into one-another, when 
on- and off-balance sheet activities are involved, and when domestic and foreign business is 
conducted by financial firms for which the regulator is responsible. The second problem, market 
conduct, is no less difficult when end-users of the system range across a broad spectrum of 
financial sophistication from mass-market retail clients to highly sophisticated trading 
counterparties. 
 
EXHIBIT 21 
In going about their business, regulators continuously face the possibility that ’inadequate’ 
regulation will result in costly failures, on the one hand, and on the other hand the possibility that 
’overregulation’ will create opportunity costs in the form of financial efficiencies not achieved, or in 
the relocation of firms and financial transactions to other regulatory regimes offering a lower NRB. 
Since any improvements in financial stability can only be measured in terms of damage that did not 
occur and costs that were successfully avoided, the argumentation surrounding financial regulation 
is invariably based on ’what if’ hypotheticals. In effect, regulators are constantly compelled to rethink 
the balance between financial efficiency and creativity on the one hand, and safety, stability and 
suitable market conduct in the financial system on the other. They face the daunting task of 
designing an ’optimum’ regulatory and supervisory structure that provides the desired degree of 
stability at minimum cost to efficiency, innovation and competitiveness – and to do so in a way that 
effectively aligns such policies among regulatory authorities functionally and internationally and 
avoids ’fault lines’ across regulatory regimes. There are no easy answers. There are only ’better’ 
and ’worse’ solutions as perceived by the constituents to whom the regulators are ultimately 
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accountable. 
 The principal options that regulators have at their disposal range from ’fitness and 
properness’ criteria under which a financial institution may be established, continue to operate or be 
shut-down – to line-of-business regulation as to what types business financial institutions may 
engage in, adequacy of capital and liquidity, limits on various types of exposures, and the like, as 
well as policies governing marking-to-market of assets and liabilities. And as noted, regulatory 
initiatives can create financial market distortions of their own, which become especially problematic 
when financial products and processes evolve rapidly and the regulator can easily get one or two 
steps behind. 
    A third element involves the regulatory machinery itself, ranging from reliance on self-
control on the part of boards and senior managements of financial firms concerned with protecting 
the value of their franchises, through financial services industry self-regulation via Self Regulatory 
Organisations (SROs), to public oversight by regulators with teeth - including civil suits and criminal 
prosecution. 
 
 
Self-regulation remains controversial, since financial firms continue to suffer from incidents of 
business losses and misconduct - despite the often devastating effects on the value of their 
franchises. Management responds with expensive compliance infrastructures. But nothing is 
perfect, and serious problems continue to slip through the cracks. And ’ethics’ programs intended to 
assure appropriate professional conduct are often pursued with lack of seriousness, at worst 
creating a general sense of cynicism. People have to be convinced that a good defence is as 
important as a good offence in determining sustainable competitive success. This is something that 
is extraordinarily difficult to put into practice in a highly competitive environment and requires an 
unusual degree of senior management leadership and commitment (see Smith and Walter, 1997). 
 Control through SROs is likewise subject to dispute. Private-sector entities that have been 
certified as part of the regulatory infrastructure in the US, for example, have repeatedly encountered 
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problems. For example, in 1996 one of the key US SROs, the National Association of Security 
Dealers, and some of its member firms were assessed heavy monetary penalties in connection with 
rigging OTC equity markets. A vigorous attempt to refute empirical evidence of improprieties 
eventually yielded to major changes in regulatory and market practices. Another example: In 2001 
Moody’s pleaded guilty to criminal charges of obstruction of justice in connection with an SEC 
investigation of the firm’s unsolicited ratings practices. One has to wonder how such management 
lapses in highly reputation-sensitive institutions could happen. Other well-known examples occurred 
in the United Kingdom, which relied heavily on the SRO approach. In 1994 the self-regulatory body 
governing pension funds (Investment Management Regulatory Organisation) failed to catch the 
disappearance of pension assets from Robert Maxwell’s Mirror Group Newspapers, and the 
Personal Investment Authority (PIA) for years failed to act against deceptive insurance sales 
practices at the retail level. In the Maxwell case, a 2001 report of the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) described the conduct of the firms involved as beset with ’cliquishness, greed and 
amateurism.’ Nor did the Amsterdam Stock Exchange cover itself with glory in the disastrous 2000 
World Online IPO, although it evidently was able to avert the most egregious aspects of market 
misconduct.5 
 Inevitable in self-regulation are charges of the fox watching the henhouse. As in the 
Maxwell case, the City of London has come in for a good deal of criticism for the ’easygoing ways’ 
that have done so much to contribute to its competitive success in the global marketplace.6 But 
reliance on public-oversight for financial regulation has its own problems, since virtually any 
regulatory initiative is likely to run confront powerful vested interests that would like nothing better 
than to bend the rules in their favour (Kane, 1987). The political manipulation of the savings and 
loan regulators in the US during the 1980s is a classic example, creating massive incremental 
losses for taxpayers. Even the judicial process that is supposed to arbitrate or adjudicate matters of 
regulatory policy may not always be entirely free of political influence or popular opinion. 
 Just as there are tradeoffs implicit in Exhibits 21-23 between financial system performance 
and stability, there are also tradeoffs between regulation and supervision. Some regulatory options 
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(for example capital adequacy rules) are fairly easy to supervise but full of distortive potential due to 
their broad-gauge nature (even with the higher level of granularity proposed in the revised Basle 
accords). Others (for example fitness and properness criteria) may be highly cost-effective but 
devilishly difficulty to supervise. Finally there are tradeoffs between supervision and performance, 
with some supervisory techniques far more costly to comply with then others. Regulators must try to 
optimize across this three-dimensional set of tradeoffs under conditions of rapid market and industry 
change, blurred institutional and activity demarcations, and functional as well as international 
regulatory fault-lines. 
 
2.6 The American regulatory landscape – any lessons for Europe? 
 
Some have argued that the evolution of the financial system in large single-currency areas may be 
best examined in the US context (despite the peculiarities that have prevailed in that environment) 
and that perhaps some useful lessons can be drawn as the evolution of European financial 
integration follows some of the same patterns. If the financial intermediation dynamics and their 
institutional consequences are in fact generic, as Sections 2.2 and 2.3 suggest, then there may be 
some merit in this view.  
 A first observation from the US experience is that, on balance, commercial banks clearly 
carry a net regulatory burden that, in terms of the actual requirements and costs of compliance, has 
been vastly greater than that which applies to the securities industry and other nonbank 
intermediaries. This has arguably had much to do with the evolution of the country’s financial 
structure, generally to the detriment of commercial banking. Institutional regulation of nonbank 
intermediaries is relatively light, but regulation of business conduct is relatively heavy. 
 For example, when Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 it focused on ’truth in new 
issues’, requiring prospectuses and creating underwriting liabilities to be shared by both companies 
and their investment bankers. It then passed the Securities Act of 1934, which set up the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and focused on the conduct of secondary markets. Later on, in 
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the 1960s, it passed the Securities Investor Protection Act, which provided for a guarantee fund 
(paid-in by the securities industry and supported by a line of credit from the US Treasury) to protect 
investors who maintain brokerage accounts from losses associated with the failure of the securities 
firms involved. None of these measures, however, provided for the government to guarantee 
deposits with securities dealers, nor did it in any way guarantee investment results. So there was 
less need to get ’inside’ the securities firms – the taxpayer was not at risk. Where the taxpayers 
were at risk, in commercial banking and savings institutions, regulation was much more onerous 
and compliance much more costly, ultimately damaging these institutions’ market shares in the 
financial evolution process. 
 Although the SEC developed into a forthright regulator, willing to use its powers to protect 
individual investors and insure the integrity of the markets, most of the discipline to which US 
nonbank financial firms have been subject since 1934 is provided by the market itself. Prices have 
risen and fallen. Investors have often lost money. Many securities firms have failed or have been 
taken over by competitors. Others have entered the industry with a modest capital investment and 
succeeded. Firms are in fact ’regulated’ by the requirements of their customers, their creditors and 
their owners – requirements demanding marked-to-market accounting, adequate capitalisation and 
disclosure of all liabilities, as well as supervisory and legal proceedings. Customers presumably 
require good service and honest dealings or they will change vendors. These market-driven 
requirements, many would argue, have proven to be as effective regulators of business conduct as 
any body established by government, particularly in the securities industry. 
 The US approach, in short, forces independent securities firms (or separately capitalised 
securities firms that are part of bank holding companies) to pay great attention to managing risks, 
managing costs and ensuring profitability in a mark-to-market environment. There is no lender of 
last resort for the individual firm. In addition, they are subject to the costs of maintaining expensive 
compliance systems, and since they are dependent on banks for much of their funding, they have to 
meet acceptable credit standards. Even in the case of massive failures like Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, regulators allowed the failure to run its course, taking care only to provide sufficient 
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liquidity to the market during the crisis period. When multifunctional financial firms began to emerge 
in the US during the 1990s and particularly after 1999, the basic approach has been regulation by 
function, requiring holding company structures with separately capitalised banking and non-banking 
affiliates.  
 Regulation in the US has been carried out through a crazy-quilt of agencies including the 
Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Securities and Exchange Commission plus SROs like the NASD, FASB, CFTC and the major 
financial exchanges. Sometimes nonfinancial regulators get involved, like the Department of 
Labour, the Special Trade Representative, the antitrust and consumer protection agencies and 
various Congressional committees. In addition there are the courts, with particular importance 
accorded the Chancery Court of the State of Delaware. The whole thing is replicated to some extent 
at the state level, with state banking and securities commissions as well as insurance regulation, 
which rests entirely with the states.  
The system is certainly subject to unnecessary complexity and excessive regulatory costs. 
In recognition of this, it has been partially streamlined in the 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
deregulation. On the other hand, there is a sense that regulatory competition may not be so bad in 
fostering vigorous competition and financial innovation. ’Regulator shopping’ in search of lower 
NRBs can sometimes pay economic dividends. And some of the major regulatory problems of the 
recent past – notably the BCCI debacle in 1991, theft of client assets in the custody unit of Bankers 
Trust Company in 1998, and evasion of banking regulations in the case of the Crédit Lyonnais - 
Executive Life scandal in 2001 – were all uncovered at the state, not federal, level. This suggests 
that sometimes more eyes are better than fewer. 
 Mistakes have certainly been made in US financial regulation, and there have doubtless 
been significant opportunity costs associated with overregulation. One example is the ongoing self-
dealing prohibition under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which 
prohibits transactions between the investment banking and pension fund management units of the 
same financial firm. And the way the LTCM collapse was handled by the Federal Reserve in 1998 
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continues to be widely debated. But by and large the system has delivered an efficient, and creative 
financial structure that is supportive of US growth and development and at the same time has been 
tolerably stable. Maybe this is as good as can be expected. If there are lessons, they are that 
regulatory messiness and competition is not always bad, and can lead to unexpected dynamism as 
default solutions are left to the market instead of the regulators. There are accidents imbedded in 
this approach, but so far they have been reasonably tolerable. 
 
Europe is Different 
In Europe, of course, there has been no tradition of separation of commercial banking, investment 
banking and insurance of the type that existed in the United States since 1933 and was only 
liberalised fully in 1999. Instead, the ’universal banking’ model has predominated from Finland to 
Portugal and banks have for the most part been able to engage in all types of financial services - 
retail and wholesale, commercial banking, investment banking, asset management, as well as 
insurance underwriting and distribution. Savings banks, cooperative banks, state-owned banks, 
private banks and in a few cases more or less independent investment banks have also been 
important elements in some of the national markets. Reflecting this structure, bank regulation and 
supervision has generally been in the domain of the national central banks or independent 
supervisory agencies working in cooperation with the central banks, responsible for all aspects of 
universal bank regulation – usually except for insurance and in some cases specialised activities 
like mortgage banking, placed under separate regulatory authorities. And in contrast to the US, 
there is little history or tradition of regulatory competition within national financial systems, with 
some exceptions like Germany and its regional stock exchanges. 
 Given their multiple areas of activity centred around core commercial banking functions, the 
major European players in the financial markets can reasonably be considered ‘too big to fail’ in the 
context of their national regulatory domains. This means that, unlike the United States or Japan, 
significant losses incurred in the securities or insurance business could bring down a bank which, in 
turn, is likely to be bailed out by taxpayers through a government take-over, recapitalisation, forced 
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merger with a government capital injection, or a number other techniques.7 This means that 
European financial regulators may find it as necessary to safeguard those businesses in order to 
safeguard the banking business. Failure to provide this kind of symmetry in regulation could end in 
disaster. No bank failure in Europe has so far been triggered by securities or insurance losses. But 
it can easily happen – despite the disastrous trading activities which ultimately brought it down, it 
was the responsibility of the Bank of England, as home country regulator, to supervise Baring’s 
global activities, a case that was an object lesson in how difficult this is to do. 
 The European regulatory overlay anchored in EU directives cover the right of banks, 
securities firms, asset managers and insurers to engage in business throughout the region, the 
adequacy of capital, as well as the establishment and marketing of collective investment vehicles 
like mutual funds. One can argue that the ’single passport’ provisions and home-country 
responsibility for institutional fitness and properness were an appropriate response to reconciling 
the single market objectives in the EU with appropriate regulation of the financial services sector. All 
was supposed to be in place at the beginning of 1993. But delays and selective implementation by 
member governments dragged-out the process so that, almost a decade later, the benefits of the 
single market initiatives in this sector are probably a fraction of what they might have been. There 
remain important problems with respect to regulatory symmetry between banks and nonbank 
financial services firms. Perhaps most seriously, there remains persistent dissonance in conduct of 
business rules.  
 The latter continue to be the exclusive responsibility of host-country authorities. Financial 
institutions doing business in the EU must deal with 16 different sets of rules (if the Eurobond 
market is included). These have gradually converged towards a consensus on minimum acceptable 
conduct-of-business standards, although they remain far apart in detail. Areas of particular interest 
include insider trading and information disclosure. For example, the view that insider trading is a 
crime, rather than a professional indiscretion, has been new in most of Europe – few have been 
jailed for insider trading, and in several EU countries it is still not a criminal offence. On information 
disclosure in securities new issues, there has been only limited standardization of the content and 
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distribution of prospectuses covering equity, bond and Eurobond issues for sale to individuals and 
institutions in the member countries. The devil is in the details. 
 If a sound regulatory balance is difficult to strike within a single sovereign state, it is even 
more difficult to achieve in a regional or global environment where differences in regulation and its 
implementation can lead to migration of financial activities in line with relative net regulatory 
burdens. In a federal state like the United States there are limits to NRB differences that can 
emerge – although there are some. A confederation of sovereign states like the EU obviously has 
much greater scope for NRB differences, despite the harmonisation imbedded in the EU’s various 
financial services directives. Each of these represents an appropriate response to the regulatory 
issues involved. But each leaves open at least some prospect for regulatory arbitrage among the 
participating countries and ’fault lines’ across national regulatory systems – particularly as countries 
strive for a share of financial value-added. Players based in the more heavily regulated countries 
will successfully lobby for liberalisation, and the view that there ultimately has to be a broad-gauge 
consensus on common sense, minimum acceptable standards has gained momentum. But once 
again, the devil is in the details. 
 So far, progress in Europe has been painfully slow. As a result, in terms of Exhibit 1, the 
cost and availability of capital to end-users of the financial system (notably in the business sector) 
remains unnecessarily high and the returns to capital for end-users (notably households and most 
importantly pension investors) remains unnecessarily low. This has doubtless had an adverse 
overall impact on Europe’s economic performance, both in terms of static welfare losses to 
consumers and producers and dynamic underperformence reflected in the process of structural 
adjustment and the rate of growth.  
 The most promising European response to this regulatory drag on economic welfare was 
the Lamfalussy Committee’s framework report (2000). Its conclusions were straightforward and 
essentially performance-driven: 1. modernising financial market regulations, 2. creating open and 
transparent markets that facilitate achieving investor objectives and capital-raising, 3. encouraging 
the development of pan-European financial products that are easily and cheaply traded in liquid 
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markets, and 4. developing appropriate standards of consumer protection. 
 Judging from the Lamfalussy Committee final report (2001), European convergence is likely 
to involve centralised regulatory structures at the national level – emphasizing efficiency, and 
accountability – along the lines of the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA), which was created in 
2000 as a result of reforms that began in 1997. It covers both institutions and market practices. The 
idea is that national regulatory convergence along these lines will contribute to reducing 
fragmentation of financial markets. Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Luxembourg and Finland are 
reportedly moving in this direction.8 In Germany, a debate has continued about regulatory domains 
of the federal and state level. France has apparently focused on the merits of separate regulators, 
one for wholesale business and institutional soundness and the other for retail activities. The 
French approach tries to be responsive to consumer protection and potential conflict of interest 
problems, as well as to the criticism that omnibus market regulators like the SEC lean too heavily to 
the retail side and that this can lead to overregulation of interprofessional wholesale markets.  
 This general convergence on a more or less consistent regulatory approach at the national 
level still leaves open the question of pan-European regulation, with wide differences of opinion as 
to necessity and timing.  
 The Lamfalussy Report simply recommends a fast-track ’securities committee’ intended to 
accelerate the process of convergence based on a ’framework’ agreed by the EU Commission, 
Council of Ministers and European Parliament. As noted earlier, small changes in regulation tend to 
trigger big changes in the playing field. Some win and some lose, and the losers’ political clout can 
postpone the day of reckoning – especially if the ’common interest’ is hard to document. So the 
Lamfalussy Committee also has more concrete recommendations on investment rules for pension 
funds, uniformity in accounting standards, access to equity markets for financial intermediaries on a 
’single passport’ basis, the definition of investment professionals, mutual recognition of wholesale 
financial markets, improvements in listing requirements for the various exchanges, a single 
prospectus for issuers throughout the EU, and improvements in information disclosure by 
corporations.9  
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 Many of these recommendations were already incorporated in the 1992 Investment 
Services Directive, but implemented unevenly or sometimes not at all. The Committee makes a 
compelling case for accelerated and forthright implementation, hardly too much to ask a decade 
after launch. So a ’regulators committee’ is foreseen in order to assure that enabling legislation and 
market rules are actually implemented. The European Securities Committee (ESC) was created in 
June 2001 to accelerate progress in line with the Lamfalussy Report’s end-2003 target. Comprised 
of representatives of the member states, the ESC is ultimately to be transformed into a pan-EU 
regulatory body charged with implementing securities legislation. The European Parliament 
immediately demanded the power to review decisions of the ESC. In June 2001 the draft single-
prospectus directive was generally welcomed, although the ’market abuse’ draft directive was highly 
criticized for being excessively broad. The reception of both suffered from a lack of consultation by 
the Commission with national financial regulators and the financial community.  
 All of these recommendations make a great deal of sense. The best features of the Anglo-
American approach are adopted and those that might not work well in the European context 
(including perhaps a central SEC with substantial enforcement powers) are de-emphasized. The 
Lamfalussy proposals, if vigorously implemented, will go a long way toward achieving the efficiency 
and growth objectives that the Committee targeted in its initial report. And within the financial sector 
itself, if European firms are eventually to gain on the current American market share of roughly 65 
per cent in global capital-raising and corporate advisory revenues, who could disagree?(see Smith 
and Walter, 2000b) 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has attempted to identify the generic processes and linkages that comprise financial 
intermediation and the determinants of high-performance financial systems. It then documented 
major structural changes that have occurred (in-market and cross-market, domestic and cross-
border), pointing out that those financial channels which exhibit greater static and dynamic 
efficiency have progressively supplanted less efficient ones. These ’financial hydraulics’, in turn, 
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have had important implications for firms that occupy the ’activity-space’ that defines the financial 
services sector – commercial banking, securities and investment banking, insurance, and asset 
management. The paper then superimposed key regulatory overlays onto the basic economics and 
facts of financial services reconfiguration, emphasizing that balancing efficiency against stability 
and fairness is never easy. Finally, linkages were drawn between structural change in financial 
intermediation and supervisory and regulatory functions, including some comparisons between US 
and European legacies and prospects. 
 The regulatory environment is central to the evolution of the financial services industry. 
Overregulation leads to opportunity costs in the form of inefficient allocation of capital to the 
detriment of end-users of the financial system and overall economic performance. Underregulation 
can promote financial collapse and all of the costs associated with systemic crises, or engender 
market inequities that eventually come back to haunt the system. Even a finely balanced degree of 
regulation carries with it the risks associated with moral hazard and adverse selection. 
 Financial regulation imposes both benefits and costs on participants, and it is optimum 
rather than minimum regulation that will attract transactions-flows to particular markets. In 
continental Europe much of the financial services industry is imbedded in large universal banks 
which are doubtless too big to fail. These in turn have to compete on a global playing field with 
independent financial firms or separately capitalised affiliates of bank holding companies. The 
former benefit from an implied taxpayer guarantee but at the same time are deprived of the need to 
be quite as sharp in managing their businesses. Achieving optimum regulatory structures in 
increasingly integrated financial markets in Europe – characterised by intense competition among 
regulatory jurisdictions  – may well be impossible without a significant degree of coordination and 
some degree of regulatory centralisation. It is for this reason that ongoing regulatory efforts are so 
important. 
 Assuming no regulatory and protectionist backsliding, the European financial market 
environment must ultimately allow various players to compete in each-others' markets 
geographically, cross-client, and cross-product.  The regulatory outcome must therefore provide a 
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reasonably level playing field for all kinds of financial institutions to compete for business across the 
entire financial intermediation spectrum. Only in this way will Europe harvest the gains of a highly 
efficient and creative financial architecture – one that is fully competitive with evolving markets 
elsewhere in the world. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
1 For an early version, see Walter, I. (1988), Global Competition in Financial Services: Market Structure, Protection and 
Trade Liberalization. 
2 The regulatory playing-field on which financial-sector reconfiguration has take place has seen substantial convergence, 
notably with the phasing-out of Article 65 of the Japan Financial Law and passage of the US Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 
1999, both of which allow strategic interpenetration of the four major activities comprising financial services depicted in 
Exhibit 6 that was severely restricted before. 
3 For a discussion of the financial markets aspects, see Dermine, J. and P. Hillion (eds) (1999), European Capital Markets 
With a Single Currency, and Walter, I. and R.C. Smith (2000), High Finance in the Euro-zone. 
4 For example, public agencies like the SEC in the US which forces firms to produce timely accounting statements and 
market guidance – such as Regulation FD (fair disclosure) in 2001 – plus non-governmental entities like the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) which lays down accounting rules and conventions, and bank supervisors who both 
monitor and produce information about financial institutions, all play an extremely important role in engendering both 
efficiency and confidence in financial markets and institutions. These contributions to economic performance have 
increasingly been documented in empirical studies. For a review, see Story, J. and I. Walter (1998), Political Economy of 
Financial Integration in Europe.  
5 See the discussion in Walter, I. (2001), World Online International N.V.. 
6 See for example ’Top Business Court Under Fire’, New York Times, 23 May 1995. 
7 Leaving aside the question whether a small country is in fact capable of bailing-out a major global bank under its regulatory 
jurisdiction. 
8 ‘A Ragbag of Reform’, The Economist, 1 March 2001. 
9 The Economist (ibid.) Quotes the case of Lernout & Hauspie, a Belgian tech firm under investigation for fraudulent 
accounting, where local investigators had to rely on the SEC’s EDGAR system for financial reports on the company. 
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Exhibit 4
U.S. Financial Assets, 1970 – 2000 Percent
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Sources: Tecis ; JP Morgan *includes fixed interest deposits, long-term investments with banks and building
society deposits
Others*
Exhibit 5
Private Asset Allocation in German Households
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Exhibit 6
Multifunctional Financial Linkages
59%
68% 61% 63%
78%
44%
24%
25%
28% 25%
18%
34%
17%
8%5%
3%
16%
3% 5%4%6%
4%1% 1%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1986-1988 1989-1991 1992-1994 1995-1997 1998-1999 2000
Banking Insurance Securities Asset Management
Exhibit 7
Worldwide Financial Services Merger Volume
$36 bn             $71 bn                $66 bn                  $225 bn                $671 bn             $439.2 bn
Exhibit 8
Financial M&A Volume, European Involved, 1997-2000
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Number of deals
$10  bn+                  0         0            0            3        1            2            0           0             3      2             1            2            1            2     3           0
$1-10 bn                  7         4            8          10           10          12   11         11           10           9             9     10          17          17           13         12
Source: JP Morgan M&A Research, Thomson Financial Securities Data
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Exhibit 9
Target Institution
Acquiring Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance
Institution
Commercial 1174 100 57 538 24 0.3 373 25 48
Banks (46.4%) (4.0%) (2.3%) (52.4%) (2.3%) (0.0%) (43.8%) (2.9%) (5.6%)
Securities 116 314 96 13 162 32 38 76 32
Firms (4.6%) (12.4%) (3.8%) (1.3%) (15.8%) (3.1%) (4.5%) (8.9%) (3.8%)
Insurance 131 55 487 73 16 168 50 12 198
Companies (5.2%) (2.2%) (19.2%) (7.1%) (1.6%) (16.4%) (5.9%) (1.4%) (23.2%)
World Total U.S. Europe
Source: Thompson Financial Securities Data.
Exhibit 10
Target Institution
Acquiring Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance Banks Securities Insurance
Institution
Commercial 136.1 49.1 4.9 31.9 38.0 0.8 63.5 7.4 2.7 49.1 36.6 1.0
Banks (22.8)% (8.2)% (0.8)% (12.7)% (15.1)% (0.3)% (25.8)% (3.0)% (1.1)% (20.2)% (15.1)% (0.4)%
Securities 23.4 84.7 18.1 7.1 54.3 8.3 9.4 17.6 2.9 6.9 31.6 13.2
Firms (3.9)% (14.2)% (3.0)% (2.8)% (21.6)% (3.3)% (3.8)% (7.2)% (1.2)% (2.8)% (13.0)% (5.4)%
Insurance 25.2 27.0 228.5 3.1 21.3 86.9 20.5 2.9 119.1 3.6 19.8 81.3
Companies (4.2)% (4.5)% (38.3)% (1.2)% (8.5)% (34.5)% (8.3)% (1.2)% (48.4)% (1.5)% (8.1)% (33.4)%
Europe-Non EuropeIntra-EuropeWorld Total U.S.-non U.S.
Source: DeLong, Smith and Walter [1998] and Thomson Financial Securities Data. The first figure is the dollar value (in billions) of M&A activ ity
and the second number in parentheses is the percentage of the total (these sum to 100 for each 3x3 matrix). Figures reported
are the sum of the equity values of the target insitutions.
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Exhibit 11
The US Financial Services Sector, 1950
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Exhibit 12
The US Financial Services Sector, 2001
Exhibit 13
Financial Services Concentration Ratios
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
45%
55%
39%
61%
26.7%
39.7%
37%
61.9%
26%
61%
40%
92.5%
40.6%
92.5%
Retail Banking
Percentage of total
deposits held by
top 30 bank holding
companies
Total deposits:
$3.6 trillion
Mortgage
Origination
Percentage of
origination
by top 10;
ranked by value
of loans out-
standing
Total originations:
$1.073 trillion
Credit Cards
Percentage of
total credit issued
by top five; ranked
by value of out-
standings
Total industry
Outstanding:
$478.7 billion
Corporate 
Lending
Percentage of 
syndicated loans
to large corporation
in which the top five
players served as the
agent bank*
Total syndicated
loans outstanding:
$1.9 trillion
Custody Banks
Percentage of total held
by top 10; ranked by
global assets under
management
Total world-wide
Assets under
Management:
$37.24 trillion (approx.)
Investment 
Banking
Percentage of wholesale
origination held by
top -ten firms (global)
Volume: $11.5 trillion
Other banks
thrifts and
credit unions
Bank holding
Cos.
*The agent bank arranges a financing pool in which other banks participate.
Sources: First Manhattan Consulting Group; Inside Mortgage Finance; the Nilson Report; Loan Pricing Corp.; Federal Reserve; Institutional Investor
Exhibit 14
Structure of Financial Institutions
United States Europe* 
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* Significant inter-country differences exist among European markets.
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Exhibit 15
The European Financial Services Sector, 2001
Exhibit 16
THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE1
US share of global:
Population2
GDP
Banking assets
Syndicated lending
Bond market cap.
Equity market cap.
Non-govt. debt new issues
Equity new issues
Completed M&A (by value)
Pension assets under mgt.
Mutual fund assets
Asset management (AUM)
Loan lead-managers
Debt & equity bookrunners
M&A advice (by value)
4.5%
28.9%
10.6%
13.5%
44.9%
50.0%
53.2%
57.0%
52.8%
59.4%
53.0%
51.1%
77.2%
66.3%
78.6%
___________________
12000 data unless otherwise noted.
2Population data for 1998.
Will Multifunctional Financial Conglomerates
Source: The Economist
Exhibit 17
•Kuhn Loeb (1986)
•E. F. Hutton (1987)
•Morgan Grenfell (1989)
•Drexel Burnham (1990)
•Shearson Lehman American Express (1993)
•Kidder Peabody (1994)
•Baring Brothers (1995)
•Kleinwort Benson (1995)
•Alex Brown (1997)
•Dillon Read (1997)
•Hoare Govett (1997)
•Robertson Stephens (1997)
•Montgomery Securities (1997)
•Peregrine Securities (1997)
•BZW (1998)
•S.G. Warburg (1998)
•NatWest Markets (1998)
•MeesPierson (1998)
•Cowen & Co (1998)
•Yamaichi Securities (1998)
•Paribas (1998)
•Hambrecht & Quist (1998)
•Charterhouse (1999)
•Phoenix Securities (1999)
•Bankers Trust Company (1999)
•Furman Selz (1999)
•Schroders (2000)
•Robert Fleming (2000)
•PaineWebber (2000)
•JP Morgan (2000)
•Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette (2000)
•Wasserstein Perella (2000)
•Beacon (2000)
•ING Barings (2001)
•Dean Witter (2001) – name dropped
•Salomon Smith Barnet – name dropped
Exhibit 18
Disappearing Investment Banks, 1986-2001
Exhibit 19
Active Underwriters and Dealers: High-Yield Bonds
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BankAmerica
Bankers Trust
Alex Brown
Deutsche Bank
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DLJ
Smith Barney
Citibank
J.P. Morgan Chase
BancAmerica
Securities
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Securities
CSFB
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Barney
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Lehman Brothers
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4
1
2
3
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6
8
9
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5
6
7
8
9
10
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20
21
22
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24
25
26
2001 2001
Source: JP Morgan Chase
The consolidation of many securities firms combined with the dealers’ reduced willingness to take risk have drastically reduced all
firms’ market-making activities.
7
Salomon Bros.
North America Europe
Citigroup 250,143 HSBC 140.693
AIG 206,084 Allianz 86,530
GECS 194,636 ING 83,530
Berkshire 105,238 UBS 73,497
JPM Chase 103,133 RB Scotland 60,865
Morgan Stanley 99,055 Lloyds TSB 60,663
Bank of America 82,745 Munich Re 60,532
American Express 72,069 AXA 58,235
Merrill Lynch 60,883 CS Group 57,719
Goldman Sachs 54,297 Barclays 53,630
Banc One 46,395 Deutsche 51,047
Schwab 41,609 AEGON 50,753
Bank of New York 41,466 Zurich 50,194
MBNA 33,007 BSCH 48,310
Marsh & McLennan 30,457 BBVA 46,774
Exhibit 20
The 15 Most Valuable Financial Services Businesses
in North America and Europe (Market cap. 4 May 2001)
Exhibit 21
Regulatory Tradeoffs, Techniques and Control
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Exhibit 22
Regulatory Tradeoffs, Techniques and Control
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Regulatory Tradeoffs, Techniques and Control
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